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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
EXPLOSIONS-LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED
BY CONCUSSION
W HEN explosives are lawfully employed and their use rea-
sonably conducted, the courts often find themselves faced
with a dilemma where the radiating vibrations cause injury to
neighboring property. The right of a party to protection in the
use, enjoyment, and exclusive possession of his property en-
counters the equal right of his neighbor to use his land for any
purpose which he may desire so long as it is lawful, and reasonable
means are employed; and where the latter utilizes explosives for
furtherance of a lawful purpose, the courts have differed as to
the theory to be followed in determining liability. Where the
explosion casts rocks and debris on to adjoining property no dif-
ficulty is found, the great majority of courts1 holding the actor
liable for a trespass. There it is considered that the invasion is
direct, and liability is generally established without considerations
of due care. It is where the damage is caused by the force of
vibrations emanating from the explosion that the decisions split.
Four theories are generally advanced in the various jurisdic-
tions: strict liability for engaging in extra-hazardous activities;2
trespass, holding that there is no distinction between invasions by
concussion and by d~bris; 3 nuisance;4 and negligence. And, it
seems to be established that Texas allows recovery upon negligence,
and possibly for nuisance.
The most recent Texas decision on the question is Stanolind Oil
14 SUMMERS, LAw OF OIL AND GAS, 58 (Perm. Ed. 1938) ; 22 Am. Jur. 180 (1939);
35 C. J. S., 239 (1943).
2 Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F. (2d) 510 (C. C. A. 2d 1931); Brown
v. L. S. Lunder Const. Co., 2 N. W. (2d) 859 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1942) ; 4 SUMMES, op. cit
supra, note 1 at 62; PROSSER ON TORTS, 448 (1941).
8 PRossER, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 79; SUMMERS, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 62;
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 158(10) (1934).
4 SUMMERS, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 62, RESTATnMzNT, TORTS, I 822, et seq. (1939);
46 C. J. S. 651 (1946); 39 Am. Jur. 280 (1942); 31 Tex. Jur. 421 (1934).
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& Gas Co. v. Lambert.' There, seismograph crews discharged ex-
plosives on adjacent lands. Plaintiff had two water wells, which
he alleged, had flowed for six years prior to the explosions, but,
that immediately after the "shots" the wells sanded in and ceased
to flow. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the plaintiff must
establish negligence before he could recover.
"The asserted liability of appellant to appellee must be based on
negligence ... Proof of the fact that appellee's wells sanded up imme-
diately after appellant had set off certain charges of explosives is
insufficient of itself to establish liability."'
Whatever criticism may be levelled7 upon this requirement of
negligence, it is adhered to in Texas, whether involving seismo-
graphic shots,' or blasting to clear a right of way,' make cement,'0
or dig telephone pole holes. 1 The rule is most tersely stated in the
often cited opinion in Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas P. C.
& 0. Co.:2
"If the purpose be lawful, physical trespass absent, primary use
reasonable, and the manner of that use duly careful, consequences
are damnum absque; otherwise, injury within proximate causation
is redressable."
Strict liability, by that name, has received but little encourage-
ment in Texas since the decision in Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co.,"8
5 222 S. W. (2d) 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
6 Id. at 126.
74 SuMmEJs, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 69: "Under the application of this rule the
utility of the operator's act is permitted to completely dominate the situation, and the
injury to neighboring owners is unredressed. It would be little consolation for them to
know that their buildings and improvements have been destroyed with due care and in
a scientific manner."
8 Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co., 213 S. W. (2d) 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)
writ of error refused, n. r. e.; Seismic Explorations v. Dobray, 169 S. W. (2d) 739 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943) writ of error ref. want of merit; Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co.
v. Rainwater, 140 S. W. (2d) 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ of error dism'd.
1 Standard Paving Co. v. McClinton, 146 S. W. (2d) 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) no
writ of error requested.
10 Universal Atlas Cement Co. v. Oswald, 135 S. W. (2d) 591 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939); affirmed 138 Tex. 159, 157 S. W. (2d) 636 (Tex. Com. App. 1941).
11 Crain v. West Texas Utilities Co., 218 S. W. (2d) 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
12 298 S. W. 554, 560 (Tex. Com. App. 1927).
18 128 Tex. 155, 96 S. W. (2d) 221 (1936).
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although it has been suggested" that Texas courts merely apply it
under a pseudonym-"nuisance." Be that as it may, the opinion
in the last cited case contained language frequently relied upon
to foreclose application of strict liability to the explosion cases:
"The storage and use of explosives is (are?) clearly within the
rule of Ryland v. Fletcher; but, as to these, we have also changed
from the common law rule, and predicate liability upon negligence,
in the absence of controlling statutes or facts so obvious as to con-
stitute a nuisance as a matter of law. '"
Trespass is generally conceded to arise where entry is made
upon land; in explosion cases the distinction is drawn between
d6bris and rocks being hurled upon another's property-a direct
invasion, and the intrusion of force in the form of concussion or
vibrations-an indirect invasion. Texas, to the consternation of
some authorities, 6 apparently joins the minority in refusing to
class concussion as a trespass. 7
11 Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tex. L. REv. 400 (1942), where it is sub-
mitted that Texas has not rejected Rylands v. Fletcher where any other court would
have applied it; that the doctrine is relative, turning upon what constitutes "natural" use
of the land; and that Texas allows recovery tinder "nuisance" without resort to negli-
gence.
15 128 Tex. 155, 162, 96 S. W. (2d) 221, 224 (1936).
it1 PsossER, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 80: ". . a marriage of legal technicality with
scientific ignorance.... It has no justification in the laws of physics or in common sense
... " Judge Hand, in Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F. (2d) 510 (C. C. A. (2d)
1931) : "Yet in every practical sense there can be no difference between a blasting which
projects rocks in such a way as to injure persons or property and a blasting which, by
creating a sudden vacuum, shatters buildings .... In each case a force is applied by
means of an element likely to do serious harm if it explodes. The distinction is based on
historical differences between the actions of trespass and case and, in our opinion, is
without logical basis." Cf. 4 SumMEnts, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 68: "In many cases of
injury by vibration the physical invasion might well be considered an entry upon land,
but certainly every vibration of a neighbor's land is not a trespass. Where is the line to
be drawn? If at the point where the vibrations cause appreciable physical injury, such
line coincides with the actor's liability for consequential injury."
11 Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co., 213 S. W. (2d) 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)
writ of error refused, n. r. e. Cf. dicta by Judge Alexander in Universal Atlas Cement
Co. v. Oswald, supra, note 10 at 593, where negligence was established, making the
observation unnecessary: "... but in cases like the one at bar where the parties own
adjoining property, and one of them intentionally sets off an explosion that rends the
earth under the premises of his neighbor, there is an actual physical destruction of the
property of the adjoining owner, and it would appear to be more reasonable to hold that
the one who set off the blast should be liable for the damages caused thereby, regardless
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Nuisance is a field of tort liability which is concerned with the
type of interest invaded rather than the quality of the conduct
involved, and generally, when the fact of nuisance is established,
it is of little import whether the conduct is intentional, negligent,
or the result of ultra-hazardous activities."8 Whether or not a recov-
ery for nuisance could be had in Texas for damages resulting
from concussion without proof of negligence is, nevertheless, not
too clear. There is language 9 which seems to imply that negli-
gence is not a necessity for recovery in nuisance cases. And, an
Oklahoma case2" has distinctly allowed recovery for damages
caused by vibrations from fly-wheels on a casinghead gas booster
station on grounds of nuisance and without recourse to negli-
gence. But, in what appears to be the single Texas decision in
point, City of Dallas v. Newberg,"' where concussion from blast-
ing allegedly damaged plaintiff's home, recovery was denied, al-
though there was some confusion as to whether or not plaintiff's
residence had actually been damaged. The language of the opinion
would seem to support liability without negligence where the act
constitutes a nuisance, but it is, at most, doubtful whether the case
promises new vistas for injured parties.
The tremendous role which explosives play in the oil industry's
exploratory process cannot be overstated, nor can the value of
oil to a modern nation be conservatively assessed. With these
economic considerations bearing forcibly upon the utility of an
operator's conduct, the difficulty of establishing nuisance would
seem to foreclose that form of relief. Therefore, it is submitted
of negligence, in the same manner as he would if he should invade the premises by the
throwing of stones."
18 46 Cor. Jur. 651; 39 Am. Jur. 280; PRossR, op. Cit, supra, note 2 at 553 et seq.
19 Columbian Carbon Co. v. Tholen, 199 S. W. (2d) 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) writ
of error refused, at 828: "To state the distinction another way, it is only where an act or
condition can become a nuisance solely by reason of the negligent manner in which it
is performed that no right of recovery can be shown independently of existence of neg-
ligence..."
20 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Vandergriff, 122 P. (2d) 1020 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1942),
citing and relying on Fairfax Oil Co., v. Bolinger, 186 Okla. 20, 97 P. (2d) 574 (1939)(vibrations arising from drilling an oil well).
21 116 S. W. (2d) 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) writ dismissed.
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